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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IT WASN'T ME! ZINGER V. STATE AND
ARKANSAS'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO THIRD-PARTY
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE. Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320
(1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
If the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful oppor-
tunity to present a complete defense,' why have Arkansas courts interpreted
Zinger v. State2 in a manner that deprives a criminal defendant of this right?
Arkansas courts have done so by their constitutionally questionable ap-
proach to the admissibility of third-party exculpatory evidence. Exculpatory
evidence is evidence tending to prove a criminal defendant's innocence,3
i.e., the criminal defendant uses exculpatory evidence to establish that some
third party, unrelated to the criminal defendant, committed the crime. The
Arkansas Supreme Court initially attempted to establish the rule with re-
spect to exculpatory evidence in Zinger.4 The opinion, however, does not
make clear precisely which approach Arkansas courts are required to follow.
In dicta the court initially discussed a relatively high standard, the direct
connection test, which requires a direct connection between the crime and a
third party.5 Next, however, the court discussed a far more lax standard for
the admissibility of the evidence, the connection combination test, permit-
ting either a direct or circumstantial evidentiary connection between the
crime and the third party.6 Finally, the court concluded that because there
was neither circumstantial nor direct evidence of a third-party perpetrator in
the case at bar, the exculpatory evidence was inadmissible.7
An examination of Zinger leads to confusion as to which precise ap-
proach the court has adopted.' This note begins by examining the various
approaches of other states in order to provide a backdrop for how Arkan-
1. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) ("Whether rooted directly in the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... or in the Compulsory Process or Confron-
tation clauses of the Sixth Amendment ... the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.").
2. 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993).
3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (9th ed. 2009).
4. 313 Ark. at 70, 852 S.W.2d at 320.
5. Id. at 75, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
6. Id. at 75-76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
7. Id. at 76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
8. See id. at 70, 852 S.W.2d at 320; see also Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence,
92 MINN. L. REv. 1629, 1647-51 (2008) (analyzing the different approaches to a defendant's
claim to innocence).
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sas's approach fits into the national framework of the admissibility of excul-
patory evidence.9 It then examines Zinger and the Arkansas cases that have
followed.' Finally, it suggests that in light of the implications the current
Arkansas approaches have on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of crim-
inal defendants, the court should adopt a new standard based on a strict ap-
plication of Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.1"
II. BACKGROUND
There are various tests for the admissibility of exculpatory evidence,
and each raises different constitutional concerns. It is pertinent to first brief-
ly describe the different approaches that courts have developed to determine
the admissibility of this evidence. 2 Although certain federal circuit courts or
state courts will be referenced in relation to each test, it is important to note
that the tests are applied inconsistently among various jurisdictions. The
courts will often look beyond a particular test and use other standards, tests,
or factors to determine whether to admit the exculpatory evidence. There-
fore, analysis of a particular court's approach to this type of evidence will
merely act as an illustration to explain how each particular test operates.
Next, with this general framework, Arkansas's approach will be ex-
amined more thoroughly beginning with the Zinger case itself. 3 Finally, the
section will conclude with an explanation of the test that has seemingly been
adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court. 4
A. Road to Zinger: Differing Approaches to Exculpatory Evidence
1. The Relevancy Test
The relevancy test is based on Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and
402.'5 Rule 401 states that "'[rlelevant evidence [is] evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the de-
termination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
9. See infra Part N.A.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. See infra Part III.C.2.
12. See infra Part I.A.1.
13. See infra Part II.B.1.
14. See infra Part II.B.4.
15. See Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the "Legitimate Tendency" Standard of
Admissibility (and Doesn't Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1023, 1024 (2001)




without the evidence."' 6 Rule 402 states that "[a]ll relevant evidence is ad-
missible" and "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible."' 7
The relevancy test is a fairly lax standard.'8 It gives the judge broad
discretion in determining whether to admit the exculpatory evidence. 9 A
North Carolina court employing the relevancy test noted that the standard is
easily satisfied and "'[a]ny evidence calculated to throw light upon the
crime charged' should be admitted by the trial court."2
In U.S. v. Johnson,2 the defendant was accused of burning down an
Alabama high school in 1994.22 The government appealed from a magistrate
judge's order allowing exculpatory evidence, which implicated five other
possible arson suspects, to be admitted. 23 To determine whether the exculpa-
tory evidence should have been admitted, the court analyzed the evidence
presented for each of the five third-party suspects.24 For example, Hulond
Humphries, the high school's principal, was implicated as a possible third-
party perpetrator. The court noted a substantial amount of relevant motive
evidence stemming from months of racial tension at the high school,
Humphries' outrage over interracial dating, and the possibility that he may
lose his job.26 Moreover, the evidence against Humphries suggested a great
deal of relevant opportunity evidence. For instance, Humphries had pur-
chased five gallons of gasoline one week before the fire, and he was present
at the school a mere three hours before the fire destroyed the building.27
The court began by applying the relevancy test to determine whether to
admit evidence that another person, like Humphries, could have committed
the arson.28 In discussing the Federal Rules of Evidence, the court noted that
relevance alone does not require the evidence to be admitted.29 Relying on
Rule 403, the court indicated that there must be a balancing of interests be-
tween the "defendant's 'strong interest in presenting exculpatory evidence,"'
and the "state's interest 'in promoting reliable trials, particularly in prevent-
16. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
17. FED. R. EVID. 402.
18. State v. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d 442, 449 (N.C. 1988).
19. State v. Williams, 650 P.2d 1202, 1213 (Ariz. 1982) (citing State v. Renteria, 520
P.2d 316, 317 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974)).
20. McElrath, 366 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting State v. Huffstetler, 322 S.E.2d 110, 118
(N.C. 1984)).
21. 904 F. Supp. 1303 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
22. Id. at 1305.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1306.
26. Id.
27. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. at 1306.




ing the injection of collateral issues into the trial through unsupported specu-
lation about the guilt of another party."',3 Analyzing the admissibility of the
exculpatory evidence presented, which implicated Humphries as a third-
party perpetrator, the court weighed all of the relevant evidence connecting
him to the crime: his motive; his placement at the scene of the crime mere
hours before it occurred; his purchase of gasoline one week prior to the inci-
dent; removal of personal effects from the school one week preceding the
fire; evidence that he told friends of his depression problems the night of the
crime; and two prior confessions of guilt.3
Because of this strong motive and opportunity evidence, the court de-
termined that the evidence was certainly admissible under Federal Rules of
Evidence standards.32 Moreover, the court stated that even if the exculpatory
evidence was not admissible under the federal rules, the evidence was abso-
lutely required to be admitted because of the constitutional guarantees to
criminal defendants found in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 3 Although
courts using the relevancy test use the language of the relevancy rules, they
tend to effectively look at the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in con-
necting the third party to the crime.34 Courts do so by analyzing "the
strength of the nexus between the proffered evidence and the guilt of the
third party."35 In Johnson, the court required the nexus between the exculpa-
tory evidence and the crime to be substantial and probative.36
2. The Direct Connection Test
The next test is the direct connection test. A connection test of some
sort is the most popular approach to exculpatory evidence among the various
jurisdictions.37 Courts applying the direct connection test determine the ad-
30. Id. at 1311 (quoting Cikora v. Duggar, 840 F.2d 893, 898 (11 th Cir. 1988)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1306.
33. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. at 1310 (relying on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments the court
unequivocally announced that a defendant "has a right to present to the jury substantial and
reliable exculpatory evidence that another person committed the crime").
34. Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting A Burden of Production on the Defendant Before
Admitting Evidence That Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged. Is It Constitutional?,
76 NEB. L. REV. 272, 278 (1997).
35. Id. (suggesting that courts applying the relevancy test in this manner place the
burden of proof on the defendant); see infra Part III.B.2.
36. 904 F. Supp. 1303, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
37. David McCord, "But Perry Mason Made It Look So Easy!": The Admissibility of
Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest That Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN.
L. REv. 917, 936-38 (1996). Professor McCord notes that of the fifty states, federal courts,
and District of Columbia, only thirty-six jurisdictions have enough case law on exculpatory
evidence to support a thorough analysis. Id. at 936. He contends that of these thirty-six juris-
dictions, "twenty-five adhere at least in part to the direct connection doctrine." Id. Of the
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missibility of exculpatory evidence by examining whether the proffered
evidence directly connects the third party to the charged crime.3" Courts tend
to admit the evidence only when a direct connection links the crime with a
third party.39 Courts applying this test hold that evidence that does no more
than create an inference or conjecture as to another's guilt is inadmissible."n
For example, in State v. Smith,"1 the court used the direct connection
test. There, the defendant appealed from a death judgment for the brutal
slayings of a mother and son by hatchet.42 The defendant argued exculpatory
evidence implicating a man named J. W. Yates, who had been in the neigh-
borhood at the time of the crime, had been improperly excluded at trial.43
The court held that this evidence was properly excluded because it would
merely raise an inference as to Yates's opportunity to commit the crime.
44
3. The 403 Test
The 403 test is derived from Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which
states that "[alithough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue de-
lay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 4 5
In People v. Hall,4 6 the defendant appealed his conviction of first-
degree murder, second-degree robbery, and burglary.4 7 Initially, no foul play
was suspected when victim Israel Deasonhouse was discovered dead cov-
remaining eleven jurisdictions, McCord asserts eight appear to rely solely on a balancing test,
which weighs the probative value of the evidence against any potential unfair prejudice. Id. at
937. Finally, according to McCord, three courts "supplement the balance test with a capable-
of-raising-a-reasonable-doubt approach." Id. at 937-38. McCord also notes that Maine is the
most distinct jurisdiction because it has "explicitly reject[ed] the direct connection doctrine as
setting too high a standard." Id. at 938 (emphasis omitted).
38. Id. at 975. Professor McCord finds the direct connection test to be the predominate
approach despite how the deciding court tends to term their admissibility standard. Id. at
936-38.
39. E.g., White v. State, 285 P. 503, 510 (Nev. 1930) (declining to admit evidence of a
third party's guilt where there was no evidence directly connecting the third party to the
killing); State v. Smith, 189 S.E. 175, 176 (N.C. 1937) ("[lIt is well settled that such
evidence is not admissible unless it points directly to the guilt of the third party[;] evidence
which does no more than create an inference or conjecture as to such guilt is inadmissible.").
40. State v. Wilson, 367 S.E.2d 589, 600 (N.C. 1988).
41. 189 S.E. 175 (N.C. 1937).
42. Id. at 175-76. The defendant also appealed his first-degree burglary conviction.
43. Id. at 176-77.
44. Id.
45. FED. R. EviD. 403.
46. 718 P.2d 99 (Cal. 1986).
47. Id. at 100-01.
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ered in cottage cheese and excrement. 8 Afterwards, however, an individual
named Rhae Foust was arrested for drunk driving. In an effort to mitigate
his charges, Foust told police that the defendant, Hall, had explained to him
in specific and accurately descriptive details how another man, David Ro-
driguez, had killed the elderly Deasonhouse. 49 After Hall was arrested, he
continued to insist that Rodriguez had committed the crime and denied hav-
ing such accurate and descriptive knowledge of the crime.5" At trial, the
judge declined to admit testimony suggesting that Foust, rather than Rodri-
guez or Hall, actually killed Deasonhouse 1 The trial judge reasoned that
although this testimony was relevant, it lacked more than a possible suspi-
cion that Foust committed the murder, and it did not meet the requisite
probative value standard for admission. 2
On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of California overruled the
trial court judge and clarified the correct 403 test to be used.53 In clarifying
the applicable law, the court articulated the 403 test as "simply treat[ing]
third-party culpability evidence of this kind like any other evidence: if rele-
vant it is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion.,1 4 The court further de-
clared that the trial court should avoid "a hasty conclusion" that the defen-
dant's exculpatory evidence is "incredible" because this is a question for the
jury, not for a judge.55 Lastly, the court held that courts applying this stan-
dard "must focus on the actual degree of risk that the admission of relevant
evidence may result in undue delay, prejudice, or confusion. 56 Although the
trial judge misapplied the law, the court concluded that the error was harm-
less and affirmed the defendant's conviction.57
4. The Balancing Test
Courts using the balancing test "weigh[] the interests of the accused in
proving his innocence against the state's interest in convicting the guilty,
48. Id. at 101.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 102.
52. Hall, 718 P.2d at 102.
53. Id. at 104.
54. Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. id. "[I]f the evidence is really of no appreciable value no harm is done in admitting
it; but if the evidence is in truth calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the court should not
attempt to decide for the jury that this doubt is purely speculative and fantastic but should
afford the accused every opportunity to create that doubt." Id. (quoting IA JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 139 (Peter Tillers rev. ed. 1980)).
57. Id. at 105-06.
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[while] the ultimate admissibility decision is based on the strength of the
evidence implicating the third party in the crime."58 "The balancing test
weighs and evaluates the following two interests: (1) the legitimate interests
of the defendant to present a defense, and (2) the interests of the state to
administer fair and reliable trials."5 9 One commentator asserts, however, that
while these courts claim to use a strict balancing test, they also couple it
with a "'critical and reliable' twist. '60 The "critical and reliable twist" within
the balancing test demands that "[e]ven after evaluating, balancing, and
weighing the diverse interests, '[w]here the state interest is strong, only the
exclusion of critical, reliable, and highly probative evidence will violate due
process. When the state interest is weaker, less significant evidence is pro-
tected.9'16
In Perry v. Rushen,2 the Ninth Circuit discussed the balancing test in
relation to the admissibility of exculpatory evidence.63 There, the defendant
appealed a conviction of aggravated assault for allegedly attacking a woman
along a jogging path.64 On the day of the attack, the woman had asked a man
with a dog for directions, but, against her wishes, the man began to walk
with her.65 He then grabbed her by the neck and pulled her off the path; as
she began to scream, he began to bang her head against the trees.66 Her
screams attracted other joggers and the assailant fled.67 Later, the victim
identified the defendant as the assailant based on his general appearance and
a distinctive scar on his forehead.68
At trial, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence that a man by
the name of Wolfe had committed the assault.69 This evidence consisted of
testimony by two witnesses who were robbed and raped by Wolfe in the
same area of the park only three days earlier.7 The defendant also asserted
these similarities to Wolfe: both were African-American; they were of simi-
lar height and weight; both had braided hair on the day of the attack; and on
the afternoon of the assault, Wolfe had been wearing a brown leather jacket
58. Everhart, supra note 33, at 282.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 277 (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983)).
61. Id. at 282 (quoting Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983)).
62. 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1983).
63. Id. at 1452.




68. Rushen, 713 F.2d at 1448-49.




and blue jeans while the defendant had been wearing a light brown jacket
and blue warm-up pants.71
In discussing the admissibility of this evidence, the court specified that
a "court must balance the importance of the evidence against the state['s]
interest in exclusion."72 Furthermore, a court must consider the evidence
under the totality of the circumstances, including "its probative value on the
central issue, its reliability, whether it is capable of evaluation by the finder
of fact, whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative,
and whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. 7 3 In dis-
cussing the opposing interests between the state and the criminal defendant,
the court noted that in the Supreme Court of the United States cases address-
ing exculpatory evidence, the rule has been that there must be "unusually
compelling circumstances" in order to outweigh the "strong state interest in
administration of its trials. 74
Ultimately, the court found that the evidence of Wolfe as a third-party
perpetrator was too tenuous and carried with it too great a risk for confusion
of the issues to a jury.75 Therefore, the court concluded that because the ex-
culpatory evidence was "not so closely connected to the issue of his guilt or
innocence that its exclusion, based on its lack of probity and its tendency to
confuse the jury, [would not violate] due process or the right of compulsory
process. 76
5. The Reasonable Doubt Test
Under the reasonable doubt test, evidence tending to implicate a third
party "must be admitted if it is of sufficient probative value to raise a rea-
sonable doubt as to the defendant's culpability., 77 Particularly "where the
state's case is based on circumstantial evidence, the court should allow the
defendant 'wide latitude' to present all the evidence relevant to his defense,
unhampered by the piecemeal rulings on admissibility., 78 Exculpatory evi-
dence under the reasonable doubt test still permits the trial court "discretion
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1452.
73. Id. at 1452-53; see also Everhart, supra note 33, at 282 (discussing the operation of
the balancing test).
74. Rushen, 713 F.2d at 1452 (discussing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
and Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)); see infra Part II1.B.1.. for a discussion of the
significance of these Supreme Court cases.
75. Id. at 1454.
76. Id. at 1455.
77. State v. Conlogue, 474 A.2d 167, 172 (Me. 1984).
78. State v. LeClair, 425 A.2d 182, 186 (Me. 1981).
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to exclude such evidence if it is too speculative or conjectural or too discon-
nected from the facts of the case against the defendant."79
In State v. Conlogue,8 ° the defendant appealed from a conviction of
recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a one and a half year-old child.8'
During the summer of 1981, the defendant, Conlogue, and a woman named
Patricia Easier lived at a campground with Easler's three young children.82
A friend visiting the couple reported the defendant to authorities for physi-
cally abusing one of the children.83 Afterwards, a Health and Human Servic-
es representative and a detective visited the camp and took photographs of
the child.84 The child was then taken to a doctor where multiple bruises and
injuries around the child's face were discovered.85 Three days later, the child
was returned to the hospital with an acute fracture of the right arm.8 6 While
there, Easler told the doctor she did not intend to hurt the child.87 After both
the defendant and Easler were indicted, Easler retracted her previous state-
ment and claimed that she only admitted to hurting the child in order to pro-
tect the defendant.88
At the defendant's trial, the judge declined to admit the testimony of
three defense witnesses who, as former neighbors of Easler, testified that
they had seen her physically abuse her two older children.89 The appellate
court subsequently reversed, holding that the evidence had been improperly
excluded because the testimony tended to implicate Easler and was of suffi-
cient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.9"
6. Combination of Tests
Many of the courts use a combination of tests, even if they claim to be
using one of the categories mentioned above. 91 Most often, courts using one
79. Id. at 187.
80. 474 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984).





86. Conlogue, 474 A.2d at 169.
87. Id. at 170.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 172.
90. Id. at 172-73.
91. Everhart, supra note 33, at 283 (citing the following cases to illustrate a court's
use of a combination of the tests: Cikora v. Duggar, 840 F.2d 893 (11 th Cir. 1988) (using the
balancing test and the connection test); Perry v. Rushman, 713 F.2d 1447, 1454 (9th Cir.
1983) (the court began with the balancing test but ultimately excluded the exculpatory evi-
dence based solely on relevancy grounds); State v. Caulk, 542 A.2d 167 (Me. 1984) (combin-
ing the reasonable doubt test and the direct connection test)).
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of the tests also "rely on the strength of the connection between the evidence
of a third party's guilt and the commission of the crime charged."92
B. Arkansas Decides: Zinger v. State
The Arkansas Supreme Court established Arkansas's approach to ex-
culpatory evidence in the Zinger case.93 The discussion of Zinger will begin
with a brief factual description of the case94 and then discuss the authorities
that the court relied upon to reach its decision.95 Next, it will address the
holding of the case,96 and, finally, it will examine the court's analysis. 97
1. Facts
"Nikki Sue Zinger and Daniel Wayne Risher[ ]were convicted of the
first degree murder of Zinger's mother, Linda Holley ... ,98 On March 10,
1991, officers were called to Holley's home in Magnolia, Arkansas, where
they discovered her ransacked trailer and her body, which had been stabbed
a number of times and had suffered several blows to the skull.99 There was
glass from the broken rear door on top of the items strewn about the floor,
and there was evidence that someone had tried to clean up some of the blood
after the murder. °0 Investigating officers concluded that a robbery had been
staged after the victim was killed. 0'
Risher and Zinger were romantically involved; they lived part of the
time at Risher's parents' home and part of the time with Holley. 0 2 At trial,
the state presented evidence that Risher and Zinger had murdered Holley in
order to collect $90,000 in insurance proceeds for which Zinger was the
beneficiary. °3 Evidence indicated Zinger knew about Holley's insurance
policy before the murder occurred because on March 14th, four days after
Holley's body was discovered, the police found a box containing the insur-
ance papers at Risher's parents' home."°4 All of the investigating officers
92. Everhart, supra note 33, at 283.
93. Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993).
94. See infra Part II.B. 1.
95. See infra Part II.B.2.
96. See infra Part II.B.3.
97. See infra Part II.B.4.
98. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 71, 852 S.W.2d at 321.
99. Id. at 72, 852 S.W.2d at 321.
100. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
101. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
102. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
103. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
104. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 72, 852 S.W.2d at 321.
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testified that this box was not in the Rishers' trailer on March 11 th when
they had conducted a "very thorough search" of the Risher home."5
Moreover, an expert witness presented incriminating evidence col-
lected from a piece of polymer glass taken from Holley's eyeglass lens."0 6
He discovered a fragment of glass similar to the polymer glass from Hol-
ley's eyeglass lens on Risher's jacket pocket, the same jacket Risher had
been seen wearing on the day of the murder.'0 7 The expert witness also con-
cluded that a fiber removed from Risher's jacket had come from the nurse's
uniform Holley was wearing at the time of the murder.'0° Lastly, the expert
found blood on a robe inside Zinger's closet, on a pair of boots found in the
Risher home, and on the jacket Risher had been seen wearing on the day of
the attack.'09
At the trial, Risher and Zinger attempted to introduce evidence that a
third party had murdered Holley." 0 The trial court refused to admit testimo-
ny from a police officer regarding a similar murder that had occurred ap-
proximately thirty miles from Magnolia in Cullen, Louisiana."' The appel-
lants sought to admit this evidence to convince the jury that the person who
committed the crime in Louisiana also murdered Holley." 2 The testimony
suggested the following similarities to Holley's murder: the Louisiana vic-
tim had been beaten and stabbed several times; the victim was left in a posi-
tion similar to that of Holley; and there was evidence of an attempted clean-
up at the Louisiana murder scene." 3 The Louisiana crime would have also
suggested a motive for the Holley murder because the Louisiana attack was
a drug-related offense." 4 Finally, the murder weapons, a hammer and pair of
scissors, were found at the scene of the crime in Louisiana." 5 The discovery
of the weapons in Louisiana was proffered to suggest that the Louisiana
suspect had used these weapons against Holley because her death was the
result of blunt force trauma to the skull and stab wounds to the body. More-
over, the defense argued it could explain why no murder weapons had been
discovered in connection with the Holley crime." 6
105. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
106. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
107. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 321.
108. Id. at 72-73, 852 S.W.2d at 321-22.
109. Id. at 73, 852 S.W.2d at 322.
110. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 75, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
111. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
112. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
113. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
114. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
115. Id. at 75, 852 S.W.2d at 322.
116. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 75, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
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2. Discussion of Authorities
The Arkansas Supreme Court articulated the issue as follows: "under
what circumstances [is] evidence incriminating others ... relevant to prove
a defendant did not commit the crime charged"?" 7 In arriving at its decision,
the court began by examining the approaches adopted by the supreme courts
of North Carolina and California.
a. North Carolina's approach: Direct connection test
The North Carolina Supreme Court articulated its admissibility stan-
dard by stating that
[a] defendant may introduce evidence tending to show that someone oth-
er than the defendant committed the crime charged, but such evidence is
inadmissible unless it points directly to the guilt of the third party. Evi-
dence which does no more than create an inference or conjecture as to
another's guilt is inadmissible."
8
This approach to the admissibility of exculpatory evidence, as pre-
viously discussed, is the direct connection test, and it is the most difficult of
admissibility standards to meet. 19
b. California's approach: Combination test
The court then discussed an approach that the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia has used in determining whether to admit exculpatory evidence. 2°
The California court acknowledged that defendants have a right to present
exculpatory evidence, 2' but also explained that
[t]he rule does not require that any evidence, however remote, must be
admitted to show a third party's possible culpability ... [E]vidence of
mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, with-
out more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's
guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third
person to the actual perpetration of the crime. 1
22
117. Id., 852 S.W.2d at323.
118. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323. (quoting State v. Wilson, 367 S.E.2d 589, 600 (N.C. 1988))
(emphasis added).
119. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
120. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
121. Id at 75-76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.




Here, California's approach to the admissibility of exculpatory evi-
dence falls under the combination test: "' a reasonable doubt test combined
with a connection test. 124 This test requires the evidence to raise a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant's guilt, and, to do so, the court permits admission
of either direct or circumstantial evidence that a third party committed the
crime charged. 25 The latter component of California's approach infuses a
more relaxed connection test, as opposed to a strict direct connection test,
into the judge's determination of the admissibility of the evidence by per-
mitting direct or circumstantial evidence to pass admissibility muster. 126
3. Zinger's Holding
Ultimately, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that although there were
some similarities between the two crimes, "there was no evidence presented
connecting the Louisiana suspect to the Holley murder."' 27 The court noted
that the trial court was not even given the name of a third party or informa-
tion indicating whether he or she had any connection to Holley. Therefore,
the court held "there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence con-
necting the Louisiana perpetrator to the Arkansas crime, other than a few
similarities found in the two crime scenes."' 28 As a result, the court declined
to conclude that the trial court judge abused his discretion in refusing to
admit the exculpatory evidence.'
29
4. Analysis
The manner in which the Zinger case is written leads to ambiguity as to
which test the Arkansas Supreme Court has adopted. This is partially a prob-
lem of poor organization within the text of the opinion. The court begins its
discussion with North Carolina's approach: a strict direct connection test for
the admissibility of exculpatory evidence. 3 ' Next, the court discusses Cali-
fornia's approach, a combination test, which incorporates a reasonable doubt
test and a more relaxed connection test.' The court fails to properly distin-
guish these two approaches, ignoring how each of these tests sets a very
123. See discussion supra Part II.A.6.
124. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
125. People v. Kaurish, 802 P.2d 278, 295 (Cal. 1990).
126. See supra Part I.A.2.
127. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
128. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323 (emphasis added).
129. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
130. Id. at 75, 852 S.W.2d at 323 (citing State v. Wilson, "367 S.E.2d 589, 600 (N.C.
1988)).
131. Id. at 75-76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
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different standard for the admissibility of exculpatory evidence.132 The hold-
ing makes clear, however, that the court declined to adopt the strict direct
connection test as adopted by the North Carolina court. 133 As it concluded
the opinion, the court noted that the evidence of the Louisiana murder was
inadmissible because there was neither direct nor circumstantial evidence
that a third party committed Holley's murder.134 Use of this language, indic-
ative of a combination test, which incorporates the reasonable doubt test and
a more relaxed combination test, established the standard to be used in Ar-
kansas when evaluating the admissibility of exculpatory evidence. Thus,
Zinger's holding permits Arkansas trial courts to make inferences about the
possibility of a third-party perpetrator by permitting the use of circumstan-
tial evidence.'35
III. ARGUMENT
This section will begin by discussing how Arkansas courts have inter-
preted Zinger.'36 Next, it will synthesize these varying interpretations in an
attempt to understand exactly which standard the Arkansas courts are using
in relation to the admissibility of exculpatory evidence.' 37 It will then eva-
luate the constitutional implications of these Arkansas approaches.'38 Final-
ly, it will conclude with a proposal for the adoption of an entirely new ap-
proach.'3
A. So... Which Standard is It? Arkansas Courts Play the Guessing Game
1. Standard Confusion
Possibly as a result of ambiguity in the Zinger case, Arkansas courts in-
terpreting the standard for admissibility of exculpatory evidence have uti-
132. Comparing the consequences that a direct connection test has on a criminal defen-
dant with that of a more relaxed combination test, which incorporates a reasonable doubt test
and a connection test, reveals the inherent differences in the two standards. A criminal defen-
dant who may only present exculpatory evidence which directly connects a third-party to the
crime is a world away from a criminal defendant who may present direct or circumstantial
evidence in his own defense. The court's failure to clearly distinguish between the approach-
es undermines the important differences between them and, particularly, serves to undercut
the devastating implications each test has on a criminal defendant attempting to prove his
innocence. See discussion infra Part II1.B. 1.
133. Zinger, 313 Ark. at 76, 852 S.W.2d at 323.
134. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
135. Id., 852 S.W.2d at 323.
136. See infra Part 11I.A. I.
137. See infra Part IIJ.A.2.
138. See infra Part III.B.
139. See infra Part IlI.C.
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lized the strict direct connection test, a combination test, and have even used
a seemingly new approach based on Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401, 402,
and 403. 140
In Larimore v. State,'41 the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing the Arkan-
sas Rules of Evidence, declined to admit exculpatory evidence based on a
seemingly new approach. 142 Appellant Larimore had been convicted of the
first-degree murder of his wife, June.'43 June's body was discovered with
134 stab wounds to her face, torso, arms, hands, and legs.'" Investigators
determined that the crime was likely motivated by anger, as opposed to a
sexual attack or a robbery.'45 They concluded this because there was no
physical evidence of a sexual assault and June's jewelry and purse remained
untouched.46 When her body was discovered, the sliding glass door was
unlocked, the stereo was still playing, and the only household items that had
been disturbed were the telephones, which appeared to have had their cords
either unplugged or severed.
47
At trial, the appellant attempted to introduce evidence that an individu-
al named Lockman had the motive and opportunity to commit the murder. 1
48
The appellant's evidence indicated Lockman had been seen near June's
home on the morning of the murder, had previously done yard work for her,
had been caught breaking and entering into June's home to steal her proper-
ty, and had attempted to break into her home on one other occasion. 14 Each
of these incidents occurred several months before the murder. 50 The state
moved to exclude the testimony based on relevancy, and the motion was
granted.'
On appeal, the court categorized the excluded evidence as "reverse
404(b)"' 52 evidence. 53 It stated that evidence of this type must first be inde-
140. It is worth noting that the Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401, 402 and 403 correspond
directly with Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402 and 403. In re Adoption of Unif. R. Evid.,
290 Ark. 616, 717 S.W.2d 491 (1986).
141. 317 Ark. 111,877 S.W.2d 570 (1994).
142. Id. at 125, 877 S.W.2d at 576-77.
143. Id. at 115, 877 S.W.2d at 571.
144. Id. at 115-16, 877 S.W.2d at 571.
145. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 571.
146. Id. at 116, 877 S.W.2d at 571.
147. Larimore, 317 Ark. at 116, 877 S.W.2d at 571.
148. Id. at 123, 877 S.W.2d at 576.
149. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 576.
150. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 576.
151. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 576.
152. ARK. R. EVID. 404(b) states that
[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
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pendently relevant, i.e., it must "make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."' 54 The court then stated that although rele-
vant, the evidence still may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, a confusion of the issues, or
the possibility that it will mislead the jury.'55
Next, the court added an additional admissibility threshold, apart from
the admissibility hurdles based on the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. It did so
by evaluating the level of connection between the exculpatory evidence and
the crime charged.156 The court cited with favorability the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit's approach to the admissibility of this evidence, which
"requires that the evidence have 'a tendency to negate [the defendant's
guilt], and that it [pass] the Rule 403 balancing test."" 57 The court stated
that for this determination:
[s]imilarity and time connections are factors in determining the proba-
tiveness of the evidence, which must be weighed against the possibility
of confusing the issues and wasting time. Some courts have said that
there should be a sufficient nexus between the evidence and the possi-
bility of another person's guilt and that this evidence should do more
than create a mere suspicion.
158
Based upon the relatively innocuous incidents that had occurred be-
tween Lockman and June, as well as the dissimilarities between those inci-
dents and the facts of the case at bar, the court determined that the trial court
had not abused its discretion by excluding the evidence as irrelevant.'59
In Echols v. State,6 ° the Arkansas Supreme Court added to the confu-
sion by holding that the defendant could not present any exculpatory evi-
dence unless it pointed directly to third-party guilt. 6 ' As a result, the defen-
dant was barred from presenting any circumstantial evidence, which could
have raised the possibility of third-party involvement in the crime
charged.'62 Therefore, the court, citing and interpreting its own law, further
153. Larimore, 317 Ark. at 123, 877 S.W.2d at 575.
154. Id. at 123-24, 877 S.W.2d at 576 (citing ARK. R. EVID. 401).
155. Id. at 124, 877 S.W.2d at 576 (citing ARK. R. EvID. 403).
156. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 576.
157. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 576. (quoting State v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1405 (3d Cir.
1991)).
158. Id., 877 S.W.2d at 576.
159. Larimore, 317 Ark. at 125, 877 S.W.2d at 576.
160. 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996).
161. Id. at 962, 936 S.W.2d at 532 (citing Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70,
852 S.W.2d 320 (1993)).
162. Id., 936 S.W.2d at 532.
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muddied the waters of admissibility by improperly articulating the standard
it had previously set forth in Zinger and by declining to even reference the
standard it had used in Larimore'63 The Echols court then went a step fur-
ther by articulating a new rule with respect to exculpatory evidence by stat-
ing there should be a sufficient connection between the evidence and the
possibility of another person's guilt before it is admissible."6 By denying
admission of the exculpatory evidence, unless the evidence points directly to
third-party guilt, it could be inferred that a "sufficient connection" simply
requires a direct connection between a third-party perpetrator and the crime
charged.'65 However, whether "sufficient connection" was meant to wholly
exclude circumstantial evidence from the Arkansas admissibility standard is
unclear.
In Burmingham v. State,'66 the Arkansas Supreme Court once again
discussed the conflicting approaches presented in Zinger.'67 Ultimately,
however, the court relied solely on the direct connection test adopted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court and cited in Zinger.168 The court stated that
evidence that does no more than create an inference or conjecture as to
another's guilt is inadmissible.1 69 In concluding whether evidence about
similar rapes would be admissible, the court stated:
Presenting evidence that other "blue light rapes" occurred while appel-
lant was in jail without additional evidence does nothing more than
create an inference or conjecture as to another unnamed individual's
guilt in an unrelated crime. Because appellant failed to provide evidence
as to a particular third party's guilt in the rape of [the plaintiff, the evi-
dence was properly excluded]. 1
70
Because the court failed to articulate the requisite amount of connec-
tion between evidence of a third-party perpetrator and a crime, it can be in-
ferred that they relied solely on North Carolina's direct connection test.
71
Nevertheless, this ambiguity continues the confusion about which test is the
appropriate measure for the admissibility of exculpatory evidence in Arkan-
sas.
163. Id., 936 S.W.2d at 532.
164. Id., 936 S.W.2d at 532.
165. Id., 936 S.W.2d at 532.
166. 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351 (2000).
167. Id. at 109, 27 S.W.3d at 359-60.
168. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 359-60. (citing State v. Wilson, 367 S.E.2d 589, 600 (N.C. 1988)).
169. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 359-60.
170. Id. at 110, 27 S.W.3d at 360.
171. Id., 27 S.W.3d at 360.
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Finally, in Armstrong v. State,' the Arkansas Supreme Court stated
that, ultimately, the Arkansas test merely requires "that the evidence a de-
fendant wishes to admit to prove third-party guilt sufficiently connects the
other person to the crime.' 73 Although the court clearly stated its reliance
on a connection test of some sort, the court failed to articulate whether or
not circumstantial evidence was sufficient to meet the admissibility thre-
shold.'74
2. Making Sense Out of the Senseless
The hodgepodge of admissibility standards following Zinger attests to
its ambiguity and illustrates the need for a clearer articulation of the Arkan-
sas standard.'75 Most often, Arkansas courts demand direct evidence con-
necting the third party to the crime, but, as previously discussed, in some
cases the Arkansas courts are also permitting the admission of circumstan-
tial exculpatory evidence.'76 Perhaps it is easiest to conceptualize these see-
mingly conflicting standards as each essentially articulating the same thing:
All are shorthand for weighing probative value against the risk of undue
prejudice, delay, and the risk of confusion of the issues.'77 Where a rose by
any other name smells as sweet, 78 it no longer becomes relevant exactly
how a court articulates its particular admissibility standard, i.e., where re-
gardless of specific semantics, the same conventional balancing test is em-
ployed for all evidence, it becomes immaterial which precise phrase a court
uses to articulate its admissibility standard. 179 Where, however, "sufficient
connection," "direct connection," or other similar language is misread to
suggest that exculpatory evidence "occupies a special or exotic category of
proof," a problem arises. 8 ° This problem has arisen in Arkansas courts.
172. 373 Ark. 347, 284 S.W.3d 1 (2008).
173. Id. at 353, 284 S.W.3d at 5 (emphasis added).
174. Id., 284 S.W.3d at 5.
175. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
176. See discussion supra Part 1II.A. 1.
177. McCord, supra note 36, at 936; see also People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y.
2001) ("These catch phrases merely reinforce the notion that remote evidence of a third par-
ty's culpability-though relevant-will not be sufficiently probative to outweigh the risk of trial
delay, undue prejudice or jury confusion.").
178. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2.
179. People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 2001).
180. Id.; see infra Part III.C.1 (explanation of why it is problematic to treat exculpatory
evidence differently than all other types of evidence).
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B. What Does the Constitution Say About a Criminal Defendant's Rights?
To fully appreciate the consequences of treating exculpatory evidence
as "a special or exotic category of proof," it is first pertinent to discuss a
criminal defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights.18" ' Then, with these
guarantees in mind, this section will analyze the current Arkansas approach-
es and explore what this problem means for Arkansas courts and criminal
defendants. 182
1. Supreme Court of the United States Defines the Rights
"Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses of the
Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a mea-
ningful opportunity to present a complete defense.""1
83
The Supreme Court of the United States has rarely dealt with the con-
stitutionality of the various exculpatory evidence standards. The first time
the Court addressed exculpatory evidence was in Alexander v. United
States,18 4 an Arkansas case.8 5 There, the defendant was charged with the
murder of friend and business partner, Steadman. 86 On the day of the mur-
der, the defendant and Steadman were seen horseback riding together.8 7 In
addition to their firearms, the defendant carried a pistol."'R After meeting
with the defendant and Steadman, a witness testified that he saw the horses
181. Primo, 753 N.E.2d at 168; see infra Part III.B.1.
182. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
183. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467
U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see also Martin A. Hewett, A More Reliable Right to Present A De-
fense: The Compulsory Process Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 96 GEO. L.J. 273, 275
(2007) (discussing the affirmative evidentiary right granted to the criminal defendant by the
Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment-the right to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor); Jayna M. Mathieu, Reverse Spreigl Evidence: Challeng-
ing Defendants' Obligation to Exceed Prosecutorial Standards to Admit Evidence of Third
Party Guilt, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1033, 1035-36 (2002) (evaluating a state law and its implica-
tions on the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to introduce potentially exculpatory
evidence); Richard A. Nagareda, Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 1063, 1064 (1999) (discussing how a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present
witnesses will invariably override any state statute or common law decision to the contrary);
Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 569 (1978) (thorough discussion of the Confrontation
and Compulsory Process Clauses and their effect on criminal defendants).
184. 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
185. Id. at 355-56.





standing without their riders along a road.189 A few moments later, the wit-
ness testified that he heard several gun shots and saw the defendant mount
his horse and begin to lead Steadman's horse along the road. 9' Steadman's
body was discovered twelve days later with a crushed skull and a bullet hole
in the back of his ear. 191
At trial, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence suggesting
Steadman had been murdered by a woman's cuckolded husband, House.
192
The evidence consisted of testimony stating that on the day of Steadman's
murder, House had been "riding around the neighborhood armed with...
guns" looking for Steadman and his adulterous wife "who were then be-
lieved to have eloped together."'9 3 The trial judge excluded the testimony.' 94
In its first discussion regarding the admissibility of exculpatory evi-
dence, the Court noted that it was within the trial court judge's sound discre-
tion to exclude the testimony if the statements were "so remote or insignifi-
cant as to have no legitimate tendency to show that House could have com-
mitted the murder."' 95 Although the Court reversed on other grounds, dicta
suggests the Court believed the testimony did have a legitimate tendency to
suggest that House could have committed the murder.' 96
The Court next addressed exculpatory evidence in Washington v. Tex-
as."' There, the Court held a state statute, which made an accomplice's tes-
timony inadmissible in court, unconstitutional because it violated the Sixth
Amendment Compulsory Process Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 98 The defendant had been convicted of murder
with malice and sentenced to fifty years in prison. 99 At trial, the defendant
attempted to introduce an accomplice's testimony, which corroborated the
defendant's testimony that the accomplice, and not the defendant, had been
the one to fatally shoot the victim.2"' Because of the state statute, however,
the defendant was prevented from introducing the testimony of an accom-
plice to the crime charged.20 '
189. Id.
190. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 355.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 356.
193. Id. at 357.
194. Id. at 356.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 357 ("[W]e think that, if it were shown that House was in
search of Steadman, his declarations as to his purpose in so doing stand upon the same basis,
with regard to admissibility, as his conduct, and were a part of the res gestae.").
197. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
198. Id. at 18-19.
199. Id. at 15.




The Washington Court reemphasized that "the most basic ingredients
of due process" are "'a person's right to reasonable notice of [the] charge s]
against him[ ] and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.' 2 2 Further-
more, these rights include, at a minimum, the right to examine the witnesses
against the defendant, "to offer testimony, and to be represented by coun-
sel. 20 3 The Court also recognized that:
[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their atten-
dance.., is in plain terms the right to present a defense [by] the right to
present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's
to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies.
0 4
The Court concluded that a defendant's right to present witnesses is a
fundamental element of the due process of law. 2 5 Therefore, the Court held
that the defendant's right had been unconstitutionally violated and reversed
the conviction.20 6
The Court next addressed the admissibility of exculpatory evidence in
Chambers v. Mississippi. 20 7 There, the Court considered the constitutio-
nality of a state law that prevented a criminal defendant from calling
witnesses in his favor. 20 8 The Court found the state's statute unconstitu-
tional because "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
[s]tate's accusations" constituted a criminal defendant's right to due
209process.
More recently, the Supreme Court overturned a South Carolina court's
decision in Holmes v. South Carolina.2 ° The defendant had been convicted
of the brutal rape, robbery, and murder of an eighty-six year old woman2"'
At trial, the prosecution mounted a large amount of forensic evidence
against the defendant.21 2 In response, the defendant offered evidence sug-
gesting the investigation against him was motivated by a conspiracy among
202. Id. at 18 (citing In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
203. Washington, 388 U.S. at 18.
204. Id. at 19.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 23.
207. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
208. Id. at 294.
209. Id.
210. 547 U.S. 319 (2006); see also John H. Blume et al., Every Juror
Wants A Story: Narrative Relevance, Third Party Guilt and the Right to Present A Defense,
44 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1069, 1079 (2007) (a fascinating in-depth discussion of the disturbing
facts of Holmes and what effect the Supreme Court's holding has on the criminal defendant
attempting to present a meaningful defense).




law enforcement officers to frame him, as well as "attempted to undermine
the ... forensic evidence by suggesting it had been contaminated" using
poor evidence collection techniques.2 3 The defendant also offered the testi-
mony of several witnesses concerning a third-party perpetrator, seen in the
victim's neighborhood on the morning of the assault, who confessed to mul-
tiple people about his involvement in the crime.214 One witness claimed that
upon questioning the third-party perpetrator about whether he had raped and
killed the elderly woman, the man stated, "Well, you know I like older
women." 21 5 The trial court subsequently excluded all of the exculpatory evi-
dence, and the defendant was convicted of "murder, first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, first-degree burglary, and robbery;" he was sentenced to
death.216
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding
that where there is "strong evidence of an appellant's guilt, especially where
there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a third par-
ty's alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant's
own innocence., 217 After reviewing the forensic evidence against the defen-
dant, the court determined that because of the strong evidence of his guilt,
he could not overcome the forensic evidence against him.21 8
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. The Court
began by noting that "[s]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude
under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal
trials."219 After discussing the defendant's right to be given a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense, the Court noted that this right is
abridged by evidence rules that "'infringe [o]n a weighty interest of the ac-
cused' and are 'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are de-
signed to serve.' 20 In overturning South Carolina's decision, the Court
noted that excluding evidence where there is strong forensic evidence of the
defendant's guilt permits the trial judge not to focus "on the probative value
or the potential adverse effects of admitting" the exculpatory evidence, but
instead focuses on the strength of the prosecution's case. 22' Therefore, if the
prosecution's case is strong enough, the exculpatory evidence will always be
excluded, even if the evidence, when "viewed independently, would have




217. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 324 (internal citations omitted).
220. Id. (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56, 58 (1987))).
221. Id. at 329.
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great probative value" and would not pose any undue risk of prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or harassment. Interpreted this way, the South Caroli-
na standard did not serve the rational means that it was designed to promote,
i.e., excluding issues that have a very weak logical connection to the is-
sues.223 The Court stated that just "because the prosecution's evidence, if
credited, would provide strong support for a guilty verdict, it does not fol-
low that evidence of third-party guilt has only a weak logical connection to
the central issues in the case. 224 In vacating the conviction, the Court con-
cluded that South Carolina's approach to exculpatory evidence as applied in
the case was unconstitutional because the rule was arbitrary and did not ra-
tionally serve the legitimate end it purported to serve. 225
2. How Do the Arkansas Approaches Fare Under Constitutional
Scrutiny?
While Arkansas cases are unclear as to the requisite amount of connec-
tion required to admit exculpatory evidence, the clear trend among Arkansas
courts is to require a direct connection before admitting the evidence, de-
spite whatever phrasing the judge chooses in his written opinions. 26 This
direct connection requirement raises serious constitutional concerns. If the
Constitution requires that a criminal defendant be provided "a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense, ' 2 7 then requiring a direct con-
nection between the third party and the crime sets the admissibility standard
too high.
First, if the defendant cannot secure direct evidence, all of the exculpa-
tory evidence is inadmissible. 8 It is extremely important to note the impli-
cation of requiring the production of direct evidence. "Direct evidence
means eyewitness testimony. 2 29 As one commentator notes, even if ob-
tained, "eyewitness testimony is notoriously unreliable," and it is always
prey to police manipulation. 23 ° Further, even an innocent defendant will be
unlikely to secure any eyewitness testimony because of police investigation
techniques, which tend to disregard any forthcoming witness or evidence
222. Id.
223. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 330.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 331; see generally Lissa Griffin, Avoiding Wrongful Convictions:
Re-Examining the "Wrong-Person" Defense, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 129 (2009) (discussing
the Holmes decision and its relation to exculpatory evidence).
226. See supra Part III.A.1-2.
227. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
228. Everhart, supra note 33, at 280.
229. Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence: Rationality




that is adverse to the police officers' theory of the case.23' As a result of the
pressure to solve cases, "it is easy to believe that [an] investigation tends to
focus on building a case against a suspect rather than on exploring leads and
preserving evidence that might suggest [a] suspect's innocence." '232 In addi-
tion, many factors, such as a witness's fear of retaliation from the true guilty
party and the police officers' advanced investigative capabilities versus a
lone defendant's minimal resources for investigation, contribute to the near-
ly impossible task of securing eyewitness testimony.233
A direct connection requirement also puts the burden of production on
the defendant to produce evidence linking the third party to the crime.234
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not addressed the con-
stitutionality of placing the burden of proof on the criminal defendant, the
law clearly requires the state to bear the burden of proving every element of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the burden cannot constitutionally
be shifted to the accused.235 The right to present a defense, while not abso-
lute, "encompasses the ability to advance any legitimate theory of defense
and to present evidence necessary to support that theory without undue in-
terference." '36 A direct connection requirement is contrary to this notion
because, unless the criminal defendant can meet his burden of production,
all relevant defense evidence is excluded from the jury's consideration. 37
Moreover, in every crime, "the identity of the perpetrator is an element
of the crime. 2 38 Therefore, shifting the burden of production to the defen-
dant to prove the identity or other evidence about the third party is unconsti-
tutional. 39
The direct connection requirement also runs contrary to core values in
the Constitution by replacing a right to trial by jury with a judge's opinion
of whether a third party could have committed the crime.24 For the framers
of the Constitution, the jury trial was a fundamental barrier against a tyran-
nical government.241' As ultimate arbitrators on the issue of facts, juries also
serve as a vital protection against erroneous convictions.242 The Supreme
231. Id. (excluding exculpatory evidence ignores the self-fulfilling quality of police in-
vestigations).
232. Id. at 1416-17.
233. Id. at 1422.
234. Everhart, supra note 33, at 280.
235. Id. at 285.
236. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The Law and
Ethics ofShifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1643, 1682 (2000).
237. See id.
238. Everhart, supra note 33, at 285.
239. Id.
240. See Dripps, supra note 228, at 1394, for a discussion of the jury's value.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1395.
[Vol. 34
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Court of the United States has stated that the jury provides an "inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge., 243 Finally, replacing the jury's factual
findings on a material issue as critical as the identity of the perpetrator with
a judge's concept of what constitutes a "sufficient connection" in the case
violates the notion that juries function to enable common "citizens to partic-
ipate in the administration ofjustice."' 4
C. Time for a Re-Do
1. The Status Quo Cannot Stand
The ambiguity in Zinger has promoted a toxic and contradictory pattern
to the admissibility of exculpatory evidence in Arkansas courts. The Arkan-
sas approaches, requiring either a strict direct connection test, a combination
test with a more relaxed connection requirement, or mere admissibility un-
der Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403, at their very core all
suffer from the same problem: Each is treating exculpatory evidence diffe-
rently than all other evidence.245 By doing so, the criminal defendant must
overcome a nearly impossible, 46 and demonstrably higher, evidentiary bur-
den that violates the criminal defendant's constitutional rights.247
State evidence rules are also being violated. These standards permit an
Arkansas judge to ignore his very own evidence rules, which simply require
him to admit all relevant evidence 248 unless it is outweighed by the danger of
undue prejudice, delay, or confusion of the issues. 249 Under each of the Ar-
kansas approaches, the judge is effectively evaluating the type of the evi-
dence, either direct or circumstantial, and the weight of the proffered evi-
dence, thereby ignoring the "required examination of the evidence's proba-
tive value., 25' A judge improperly evaluating the exculpatory evidence in
this manner is focusing on the third-party's guilt or innocence, forcing the
criminal defendant to prove to the judge's satisfaction that the third party
actually "committed the crime or was 'largely' connected to it."2'' The prop-
243. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968)).
244. Id.
245. E.g., People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that it is problemat-
ic to treat exculpatory evidence as a "special or exotic" type of evidence and require a higher
admissibility standard for it).
246. Dripps, supra note 228, at 1422.
247. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
248. ARK. R. EVID. 401.
249. ARK. R. EVID. 403.
250. Powell, supra note 14, at 1038.




er admissibility standard analyzes the effect the proffered "evidence has
upon the defendant's culpability.
2 52
Moreover, Rule 401's relatively lax relevancy standard and Rule 403's
exclusion based on lack of probative value are designed to reinforce the
notion "that the weight of the evidence is for the jury to determine. 25 3 By
impermissibly raising the evidentiary bar and evaluating the evidence, the
judge oversteps his role and robs the jury of its position as the ultimate trier
of fact.
254
The oft-cited justification for the judge overstepping his role in this
manner, particularly in reference to the admissibility of exculpatory evi-
dence, relates to the judicial system's inherent mistrust of juries to base con-
victions and acquittals on admissible evidence rather than emotions or other
improper reasons.255 Courts arguing in favor of the judge preventing jurors
from hearing exculpatory evidence note that such evidence would "open the
door to the most fraudulent contrivances to procure the acquittal of parties
accused of crime., 256 This fear, however, is unfounded and over empha-
sized.257 First, it ignores the high value our society has placed on permitting
even two guilty men to go free in order for one innocent man to retain his
freedom.258 It also ignores the prosecution's ability to cross-examine, im-
peach untrustworthy witnesses, and prosecute perjurers.25 9 Finally, it as-
sumes that when presented with exculpatory evidence, jurors would be una-
ble to discern truth from falsity. 26 ° Social science contrarily suggests that
jurors are not easily duped and distracted by speculative and implausible
claims.26' Studies of jury behavior provide evidence that jurors are active
and curious during the trial process, and they are unlikely to go "scurrying"
after an unsupported and speculative third-party perpetrator claim.262
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5165 (1st ed. 2011) (emphasis added).
254. See supra Part III.B.2.
255. See Blume et al., supra note 209, at 1084.
256. Id. at 1085 (quoting Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11, 23 (1880)).




261. See Blume et al., supra note 209, at 1084 (citing Richard Lempert, The Jury's Role
in Administering Justice in the United States: Narrative Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a
Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 15, 18
(2002)).
262. Id. at 1086.
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2. Proposal for a New Standard: Back to the Basics
As a result of the ambiguity found in Zinger,263 Arkansas courts faced
with the admissibility of exculpatory evidence have been left to design new
standards, rephrase old standards, and always remain consistently inconsis-
tent with regard to what type and amount of evidence will pass a judge's
particular evidentiary threshold.164 To remedy this, the Arkansas Supreme
Court should entirely disregard a connection requirement and, instead, focus
solely on Arkansas Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.265
Under the suggested approach, all evidence will be treated the same,
eliminating the current misconception in Arkansas courts that admission of
exculpatory evidence requires an "exotic or specialized category of proof,"
i.e., a direct connection, to be admissible. 266 The judge will begin with a
Rule 401 relevancy determination, namely: "[t]o be relevant, the evidence
need only tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.
267
Next, the judge will evaluate the exculpatory evidence under a strict appli-
cation of Rule 403 .268 This analysis will require the judge to weigh the evi-
dence's probative value versus the danger of unfair prejudice, a confusion of
the issues, or the possibility that it will mislead the jury.269
Simply put, this approach removes the requirement for a direct connec-
tion between the third party and the crime charged. By evaluating exculpato-
ry evidence just like every other piece of evidence, the criminal defendant
will no longer be forced to pass an unbearably high evidentiary hurdle in
order to exercise his constitutional rights in presenting a complete de-
fense.270 Moreover, the state's interest in expediency will also be accommo-
dated through Rule 403 by permitting the trial judge to maintain his discre-
tion to exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by dangers of delay, prejudice, and confusion of the issues.27'
Finally, simply requiring that the evidence meet the Rule 401 and 403
standards will permit jurors to truly hear and evaluate the facts of the case.27
Under this new approach, unfounded fears about juries are lessened, and the
263. 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993).
264. See discussion supra Part III.A.1-2.
265. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing a California case adopting the same standard as
suggested in the proposal).
266. See supra Parts II.A.3, IJI.A.2, III.C.
267. State v. Gibson, 44 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Ariz. 2002).
268. Id.
269. Ark. R. Evid. 403.
270. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
271. People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 168 (N.Y. 2001).
272. See supra Part II1.B.2.
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judge will assume the proper role as the gate-keeper while the jury remains
the ultimate trier of fact.273
IV. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Supreme Court spawned a series of inconsistent and of-
tentimes contradictory cases amongst subsidiary Arkansas courts after its
holding in Zinger. The rule in Zinger, and its subsequent interpretations, has
raised serious concerns with respect to the constitutionally guaranteed rights
of criminal defendants. By adopting a test that treats the admissibility of all
evidence the same, Arkansas courts will successfully ease the negative con-
stitutional implications for the criminal defendant while simultaneously cla-
rifying the evidentiary standard for admissibility and fostering consistency
among Arkansas courts' approach to exculpatory evidence.
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